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Abstract The growing reliance on non-governmental
independent regulators in many social and economic
domains, including corporate financial reporting, has
brought to the fore concerns over their regulatory
accountability. This study looks at one aspect of the reg-
ulatory due process-regulatory impact assessment (IA).
Drawing on the analytical framework developed by Bovens
(Public accountability: a framework for the analysis and
assessment of accountability arrangements in the public
domain. CONNEX papers, Research Group 2, Democracy
and Accountability in the EU, 2006, Eur Law J 13(4):
447–468, 2007), we evaluate the contribution of IA as an
instrument for enhancing regulatory accountability in the
context of the Financial Reporting Council, an independent
regulator for the accountancy profession in the UK. The
study’s findings suggest that, despite an increasing level of
sophistication in the manner in which IA is used within
FRC, the contribution of IA to regulatory accountability
remains limited. Specifically, there are concerns as to
whether IA is used to achieve a transparent and fair regu-
latory process or simply to maintain an image of good
governance and justify policy decisions that would have
been made even in the absence of IA.
Keywords Regulation  Accountability  Impact
assessment  Due process  Financial reporting
Introduction
Recent years have seen a sustained level of scholarly
engagement with issues relating to accountability in a
variety of settings, including government and the public
sector (Mulgan 2003; Lægreid and Neby 2016), non-gov-
ernmental organizations (Fassin 2009), the corporate sector
(Reynolds and Yuthas 2008; Meng et al. 2013), and reli-
gious organizations (Yasmin et al. 2014). Examination of
the nature and effectiveness of accountability arrangements
in the regulatory context has been more limited (Jordana
et al. 2015), but is of potential significance given major
regulatory shifts characterized by the delegation of stan-
dard-setting and enforcement functions to independent
regulatory agencies (IRAs) in a variety of socially signifi-
cant regulatory domains (Mattli and Buhte 2005). In the
case of corporate reporting, reactions to the incidence of
cases of actual or alleged financial reporting malpractice
have led to a questioning of the accountancy profession’s
self-regulatory remit and to changes to establish regulatory
processes for developing reporting standards that are seen
to be technologically competent yet independent (of the
accountancy profession). In several different national
environments, for example the USA, France and the UK,
independent regulatory agencies have been established and
have been entrusted with significant public remits and
responsibilities (Osma et al. 2014; King and Case 2014).
These agencies, however, are not subject to direct gov-
ernmental control over their activities, which brings to the
fore issues and questions relating to their regulatory
accountability (Jordana et al. 2015), particularly at a time
when, arguably, the need for regulation to restore public
trust in the quality of corporate financial reporting and the
integrity of accounting professionals has never been more
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Existing research has highlighted the importance of
effective accountability mechanisms for the legitimacy of
independent regulatory agencies themselves, the proce-
dures through which they administer processes of policy
development and the outcomes of those processes, and also
the importance of regulators’ actions being embedded in
broader accountability arrangements established because
‘‘delegated decision-making has to respect certain proce-
dural norms (transparency, notice-and-comment, reason-
giving)’’ (Richardson and Eberlein 2011, p. 220). However,
there has been limited investigation of the extent to which
such procedural norms are operationalized by regulatory
agencies and in the regulatory process. Related research
has, however, provided insights into arrangements to
demonstrate the ‘‘due process’’ in accounting and auditing
standard setting (Baskerville and Newby 2002; Richardson
2008; Bamber and McMeeking 2016), the political con-
sequences of the power dynamics underlying those
arrangements (Kwok and Sharp 2005; Crawford et al.
2014), the nature of stakeholder participation and its
influence on regulatory decision-making (Durocher et al.
2007; Hoffmann and Zulch 2014).
We make a contribution to this literature by analysing
one aspect of the regulatory due process—the instrument
of regulatory impact assessment (IA). Presented as part
of an agenda for promoting better regulatory governance,
IA has been designed, inter alia, with the purpose of
enhancing the transparency of the process of policy
development and increasing the ‘‘accountability of
political decisions on the choice of regulatory measures
and policies’’ (Kirkpatrick and Parker 2007, p. 2). IA
was initially introduced in the USA, then other OECD
member states (OECD 1995; Mandelkern Group on
Better Regulation 2001) and a widening range of coun-
tries (Jacobs 2006; Radaelli 2004, 2005). IA is designed
to assist policy development but also, importantly, to
provide a ‘‘trail’’ of the due process undertaken in rela-
tion to regulatory decisions. The specific aim of this
paper is to evaluate the contribution that IA makes to
enhancing regulatory accountability of the Financial
Reporting Council (FRC) the independent regulator for
accounting and auditing in the United Kingdom (UK).
Our interest in FRC is driven by the fact that the UK is a
rare example of a country where independent regulatory
agencies, alongside government departments, have long
been subject to IA requirements and, also, because the
British approach to IA has been considered in the ‘avant-
garde of impact assessment’ (Renda 2006, p. 3). This
provides an opportunity for a more comprehensive
examination of the use of IA in an independent regula-
tory setting over a considerable period of time.
We provide rationalization of the specific accountability
enhancing elements of IA and then review their application
in 43 regulatory episodes relating to the development of
accounting and auditing rules and standards initiated by
FRC over the period between 2005 and 2015. We make use
of the accountability framework suggested by Bovens
(2006, 2007) to analyse FRC documents which demon-
strate the application of IA in relation to each episode in
order to assess whether the exercise of IA de facto con-
tributes to greater accountability of FRC’s regulatory
decisions. The findings suggest that, despite an increasing
level of sophistication in the manner in which IA is used
within FRC, its contribution to regulatory accountability
remains rather limited. Specifically, there are questions
regarding the extent to which IA is used to achieve a
transparent and fair regulatory process or simply to justify
and validate the policy decisions that would have been
made even in the absence of IA.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
The next section problematizes issues relating to regu-
latory accountability and the role of IA as applied to an
independent regulatory setting. This is followed by a
section that outlines the analytical approach employed to
assess the efficacy of IA as an accountability tool and the
evidence base for the study. The analysis of the evidence
collected about the use of IA in connection with FRC
regulation of accounting and auditing is presented in the
next section, before the final section which draws
conclusions.
Regulatory Accountability, Impact Assessment
and FRC
This section introduces key concepts that are relevant to
this study. Specifically, it problematizes the notion of
accountability in a regulatory setting and the capacity of IA
as a tool to enhance regulatory accountability. It also
contains a discussion of the roles that IA can play in the
context of independent regulation and provides a brief
overview of the approach to IA adopted by FRC.
Regulatory Accountability and IA
In a broad sense, accountability has been defined as a
‘‘relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the
actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her
conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judge-
ments, and the actor may face consequences’’ (Bovens
2007, p. 450). Over time the meaning of accountability has
evolved beyond the emphasis on being called to account
for one’s actions, with accountability instruments now
involving not just tools to report to the upper-level prin-
cipals (for example, for approval of annual reports or
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multiple-control arrangements) but also to a wider variety
of stakeholders and the public at large (for example,
through releasing minutes of board meetings, agency res-
olutions and open consultations) (Fernandez-i-Marin et al.
2015)). In this sense, accountability has been described as a
problem ‘‘of many eyes’’, involving complex considera-
tions and related to a variety of fora that a given actor can
be held accountable to (Lægreid and Neby 2016, p. 61).
Bovens (2007) argues that accountability is often
equated with ‘‘good governance’’ which is ‘‘of high quality,
at a low cost and […] performed in a courteous manner’’
(p. 450). Consequently, in a regulatory setting, poor
accountability has been linked to shortfalls in regulatory
performance and heightened risk of regulatory capture
(May 2007). However, attempts to conceptualize account-
ability in such a setting have been relatively scarce. Among
the notable exceptions is the recent volume edited by Jor-
dana and colleagues (2015) which provides a comprehen-
sive perspective on regulatory accountability. The authors
adapt Bovens’s (2007) definition of accountability to a
regulatory context as one that describes ‘‘a relationship
between power-holders and those affected by their actions’’
(p. 3) and comprises two key components: answerability
(‘‘making power-holders explain and justify their actions’’)
and enforceability (‘‘allowing the participants in the forum
to judge [poor performance]’’) (Jordana et al. 2015, p. 3).
One means through which good accountability may be
achieved is through the introduction of the formal proce-
dures that specify a range of steps to be taken to ensure that
the civil society can hold political elites and the regulatory
institutions through which they operate answerable for
their actions (Mulgan 2003; May 2007). Below, we refer to
the existing literature on regulatory accountability and IA
to argue that, as a tool of ex ante policy appraisal (Jacobs
2006; Radaelli 2010), IA represents an instrument to
establish and maintain an effective accountability rela-
tionship between the regulator and forum members.
IA has been defined as a ‘‘process of problem definition,
consultation, definition of alternative feasible options,
economic analysis of the options, and a final choice that
meets some criteria established ex ante, such as ‘the ben-
efits justify the costs’ or ‘maximization of social welfare’
or, in simpler versions, ‘minimization of compliance
costs’’’ (Coletti and Radaelli 2013, p. 1058). Hence, IA
involves evaluation of various stages of regulatory devel-
opment, from identifying policy alternatives and under-
taking a comparative assessment of them to selecting the
preferred option (Kirkpatrick and Parker 2007). Therefore,
one of the contributions of IA is its potential to describe a
process of rulemaking (Coletti and Radaelli 2013) and
make more observable, accessible and assessable the reg-
ulator’s internal decision-making, which is normally hid-
den from the public eye. Having access to this information
can thus enable a variety of stakeholders, from the political
principal to policy recipients and the public at large, to
make judgements as to the nature of the policy-making
process and whether the policy outputs produced as a result
of it are appropriate, credible and just (Radaelli 2010).
Furthermore, IA relates to policy development which pre-
cedes regulatory action and can therefore be used as a
dynamic tool for enhancing the dialogue between the reg-
ulator and its audiences (Radaelli 2010). This is in contrast
to other policy appraisal tools that focus on ex post over-
sight, such as a Standard Cost Model (Coletti and Radaelli
2013).
The argument that we develop in this study is that IA
has accountability-related properties that can enhance both
the answerability of the regulator for its actions and en-
forceability that compels the regulator to justify these
actions to its forum members (Jordana et al. 2015). The
literature on IA (Radaelli 2010; Dunlop et al. 2012) pro-
vides support for this argument by reference to a range of
aspects which highlight the potential role of IA as an
accountability instrument. Firstly, prior studies of IA
indicate that, in the context of delegated policy making, the
instrument can promote greater and more dynamic forms of
political control over the regulator’s decisions by the
political principal, such as government, an upper-level
executive or affiliated regulatory authority. Radaelli (2010)
explains how IA may play an important role in ‘‘inserting
some principles (e.g. the benefits must exceed the cost) and
hurdles (e.g. ‘‘no new rules unless a market failure is fully
documented’’)’’ (Radaelli 2010, p. 92) to re-assure the
political master that the broad political objectives are being
served and to minimize the risk of deviation from those. IA
may also contribute to the dynamism of the accountability
relationship between the regulator and forum members
through facilitating early-warning systems to detect polit-
ically dangerous or incongruent policy initiatives and
allowing intervention before the final regulatory outputs
are decided and endorsed (Radaelli 2010).
Secondly, IA can also contribute to downward
accountability by improving a regulator’s answerability to
the recipients of regulation and the general public through
stakeholder participation (Jordana et al. 2015). IA guidance
in many countries, including the UK, requires that an IA
report be published as part of the formal public consulta-
tion process. Dunlop et al. (2012), for example, point to the
communicative element of modern IA as particularly
important, with open consultation and ‘‘notice-and-com-
ment’’ arrangements facilitating ‘‘dialogic’’ encounters
between regulators and stakeholders (p. 27). In this regard,
IA has a capacity to promote a ‘‘pluralist logic’’ of
accountability, where the public consultation attends to the
information demands of the political principal but also of a
wider range of stakeholders, such as businesses, social
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groups, judiciary institutions and others. That said, it is
important to recognize the possibility of variation across
regulatory contexts in terms of the types of actors and
networks that IA mobilizes. Radaelli (2004), for example,
points to the risks of over-emphasizing certain policy
constituents, such as members of the business community,
over others, such as the general public. That approach can
create imbalances in the representational mechanisms of
policy making and also undermine the procedural legiti-
macy of regulation by reinforcing the perception that reg-
ulators use IA to project a certain ‘desired’ image.
Lastly, IA can improve enforceability (Jordana et al.
2015) by not only facilitating substantive understanding
‘‘of the cause and effect mechanisms that underpin the
policy issue’’ (Dunlop et al. 2012, p. 27) but also com-
pelling regulators to justify that regulatory solutions were
produced on the basis of that kind of understanding, par-
ticularly through an emphasis on explanation, reason-giv-
ing, and the general rationality of a legislative process
(Froud et al. 1998; Radaelli 2010). Indeed, one of the key
objectives of IA is to facilitate technically superior regu-
latory solutions, based on robust evidence, to support the
assessment of policy alternatives and selection of a pre-
ferred option (Jacobs 2006; Kirkpatrick and Parker 2007;
Radaelli 2010). From a technocratic point of view, proce-
dures such as cost assessment that now form part of IA
provide means to streamline and make uniform regulatory
decision-making to the extent that the process ‘‘becomes a
more technical and less intuitive operation, with the burden
of proof firmly assigned to those who propose or promote
the regulation’’ (Froud and Ogus 1996, p. 222). Radaelli
2010 and Froud and Ogus (1996) link the monetized
assessment of policies that IA encourages with the ideas of
rational policy analysis which mimic the decision-making
culture in the private sector by placing an emphasis upon
‘‘the careful definition of goals, the exploration of alter-
native means of achieving these, including a rigorous
analysis of the costs and benefits of each option’’ (Froud
and Ogus 1996, p. 222). Froud and Ogus (1996) also rec-
ognize, however, that the implementation of ‘‘number-
based’’ procedural steps is far from unproblematic as it is
often the case that ‘‘knowledge of the consequences of each
[policy] alternative is incomplete and the ability to appraise
all possibilities systematically is limited’’ (p. 222).
The Role of IA in the Context of IRAs
The transfer of major policy-making remits to non-gov-
ernmental regulatory agencies has brought to the fore some
‘‘fundamental issues concerning regulatory accountability’’
and related questions about ‘‘how accountability is
achieved when non-governmental actors assume important
roles in regulatory regimes’’ (May 2007, p. 9). Such
concerns arise, to a significant degree, as a consequence of
some of the characteristic features of the agencies them-
selves. Firstly, these agencies represent non-elected
(through some form of a democratic process) institutions
and, as a result, are vulnerable to a potential democratic
legitimacy deficit. More specifically, independent regula-
tors do not have the same degree of external credibility as
state institutions because, as Maggetti (2010) argues, a
transfer of policy-making authority from the state to
independent regulators does not automatically lead to a
similar transfer of legitimacy and, in fact, leads to what he
calls a ‘‘net loss of legitimacy’’. This legitimacy shortage
engenders a heightened awareness of the need for regu-
lating agencies to maintain a public perception of them-
selves as producers of fair and representative policy
outputs. Secondly, independent regulators usually enjoy
greater operational autonomy compared to government
departments as they function outside the ministerial hier-
archy. Growing public concerns over the relative political
isolation that independent regulators enjoy coupled with
their virtual autonomy in decision-making motivate them
to seek ways to demonstrate that ‘‘they are more proficient
in producing qualitatively better policy outputs than
democratic institutions’’ and that ‘‘they operate more law-
fully, transparently, openly, and fairly than ordinary
bureaucracies can do’’ (Jordana et al. 2015, p. 3). Thirdly,
IRAs find themselves exposed to accountability claims that
are more pluralistic in nature in the sense that the main-
tenance of upward accountability (to the affiliated upper-
level executive) is still a significant consideration but is
supplemented by the greater perceived importance of
downward accountability (e.g. to policy recipients). As
Righettini and Grimaldi (2015, p. 145) argue, the rise of
IRAs and the accompanying move from input-based to
output-based democratic legitimacy has led to a funda-
mental shift in a ‘‘policy constituency’’ towards the recip-
ients of regulation and other stakeholders affected by it.
The above constraints and considerations have had sig-
nificant implications not only for the way in which IRAs
organize the policy-making processes but also the
accountability arrangements in relation to those processes
and their outcomes. Specifically, prior studies have shown
that IRAs often opt for accountability solutions that facil-
itate technocratic policy making (based on skills and per-
formance assessment) and are helpful in effectively
managing the relationship between the regulator and its
wide-ranging audiences (Schrefler 2010, 2013; Righettini
and Grimaldi 2015). Righettini and Grimaldi (2015,
p. 148), for example, argue that IRAs often pursue
accountability arrangements that rely on co-regulatory
policy tools that ‘‘create mutual adjustments and compli-
ance obligations’’ and are designed to address stakeholder
demands for both information and justification.
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Importantly, they also point out that IA represents one such
accountability tool. Indeed, one of the key accountability-
related properties of IA which is particularly relevant for
IRAs (as discussed in the previous section) has to do with
its ability to maintain perceptions of a knowledge-intensive
regulatory process which is informed by a substantive
understanding of the policy issues at hand and, importantly,
to help regulators justify any resulting policy solutions by
feeding into such perceptions (Froud et al. 1998; Radaelli
2010; Dunlop et al. 2012). In this regard, Schrefler’s (2010)
nuanced account of the underlying rationales behind the
use of knowledge in the context of IRAs provides a useful
reference point for our understanding of how exactly IA
may help create and maintain the image that knowledge-
intensity is an inherent property of independent policy
making. Firstly, IA may help facilitate instrumental use of
knowledge by IRAs by establishing a connection between
research and policy decisions which ensures that ‘‘once
policy problems are identified, knowledge is the means by
which to select the best solution’’ (Schrefler 2010, p. 14)
(for a similar view, see also Dunlop et al. 2012). In this
regard, IA can help IRAs achieve their short-term objective
to be seen as producing qualitatively better policy outputs
as well as the long-term objective of increasing a general
understanding of the issues at hand.
Secondly, the objective served by IA may also involve
the strategic use of knowledge by IRAs, which may be
both political and substantiating. More specifically, in the
context of IRAs, the aforementioned properties of IA as a
mechanism of political control may be mobilized by an
independent agency as a means for ‘‘expanding its powers
and resources and safeguarding its action from the potential
opposition’’ of the oversight body or adjacent government
department (Schrefler 2010, p. 14). The substantiating
strategic usage of IA, on the other hand, may have more to
do with the desire to ‘‘justify and support the predeter-
mined/preferred policy solution’’ (Schrefler 2010, p. 10). In
this case, IA is used effectively in an ex post fashion, that
is, not as a tool for incorporating knowledge into the pro-
cess of policy analysis and selection but as a means to
support the pre-selected option and justify the subsequent
policy decision to the accountability forum and weaken any
possible challenges of that decision. Finally, organizations
such as IRAs may use knowledge symbolically to gain
legitimacy in the eyes of significant stakeholders or other
policy actors and also to conform to the logic of appro-
priateness that encourages them to make an appropriate
response to external pressures and expectations (Schrefler
2010). While, as we discussed earlier, IA can be used to
project the image of rational policy making (Radaelli
2010), prior studies have also demonstrated that the ideas
behind IA and the actual application of those are often
decoupled, pointing to the widespread occurrence of what
Dunlop et al. (2012) termed the ‘perfunctory’ use of the
instrument. In this vein, Schrefler (2010) further argues that
the reliance on knowledge instruments (such as IA) can
have a protective function in certain policy sectors (for
example, regulation of professional services) where there is
strong isomorphic pressure on regulators to be seen to
make reference to expertise and research findings. It is also
plausible that the perfunctory use of IA is more common in
the earlier stages of IA adoption as, according to Schrefler
(2010), the symbolic use of knowledge is often a prelimi-
nary form of the other two types of knowledge uses.
The above rationales behind the use of IA in the context
of IRAs are not mutually exclusive and may evolve and
coexist simultaneously. Before analysing how these ratio-
nales may shape the use of IA within FRC, we first present
a brief overview of FRC and its formal approach to IA.
IA in the Context of FRC
The FRCwas first established in 1990 as part of amajor reform
of the process for setting and overseeing compliance with
accounting standards. In 2004, its role was changed signifi-
cantly as a result of government reviews following the major
corporate scandals of the early twenty first century (Turley
2008), and the responsibilities of the FRC were expanded to
incorporate auditing as well as accounting rule making. The
agency is an independent regulator separate from the
accountingprofession in theUK, and its responsibilities include
some statutory or quasi statutory roles that are devolved by
government. Up to July 2012, FRC activities were reflected in
several operating boards which had authority for either issuing
standards or monitoring compliance. Specifically, the
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) issued accounting stan-
dards as prescribed by the Companies Act 2006 (section 464)
while the Auditing Practices Board (APB) exercised delegated
authority to set practice and ethical standards for auditing to
meet the Act’s provisions requiring ‘‘appropriate independent
arrangements’’ for regulation of auditing (section 1228 and
Schedule 10, paragraphs 9, 10 and 22). A major reform of the
structure was introduced from July 2012 and the names and
responsibilities of the component parts of FRC were changed
but the principal aspects of the approach to policy development
remain the same. Currently, accounting and auditing standards,
respectively, are considered and developed by the Corporate
ReportingCouncil and theAudit andAssuranceCouncil, as the
constituent parts of FRC that have succeeded the ASB and
APB. The standards are issued in the name of FRC itself rather
than those of the separate units.
As an independent regulatory agency operating at arm’s
length from government but exercising significant statutory
responsibilities, FRC has been subject to a government
requirement to undertake IA. Over the years, the nature of
this requirement has been subject to change. Specifically, in
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1998, the UK government introduced The Regulatory
Appraisal Guide, a document considered to be the first formal
guidance on IA (Cabinet Office 1998). Inter alia, this
encouraged more detailed analysis of policy alternatives,
including the so-called zero-option (leaving the existing reg-
ulation unchanged). Due to various initiatives and changes in
government, the IA guidance has been subject to many
revisions since it was first issued. A revised version of the
guidance published two years later (Cabinet Office 2000)
made it a formal requirement that IA reports accompany
regulations produced by ‘‘all government departments and
agencies where they exercise statutory powers and make rules
with a general effect on others’’ (p. 5), which therefore
applied to FRC. In subsequent years, the government’s Leg-
islative and Regulatory Reform Act in 2006, published fol-
lowing the Hampton review (HMSO 2005), introduced some
further changes by, inter alia, requiring that the activities of
the regulators (irrespective of whether they were government
or independent) comply with the principles of good regulation
in that they ‘(a) should be carried out in a way which is
transparent, accountable, proportionate and consistent and
(b) should be targeted only at cases in which action is needed’
(Art. 19). The latest version of the guidance was published in
2015 (BIS 2015) and reaffirms the role of IA as a continuous
process of policy appraisal. It requires that IA accompany any
proposal—from either a domestic or international source,
mandatory or voluntary, produced by a government depart-
ment or a self-regulating institution—that may have an
impact on public, private or civil society organizations.
In addition, a formal commitment to IA has been
reflected in the FRC’s own policy statements. Following
the reform of 2004, the then newly reorganized FRC
published its first Regulatory Strategy document (FRC
2004) stating commitment to ‘‘making effective use of
Regulatory Impact Assessment’’ (p. 3), and this has been
updated a number of times in subsequent years. The latest
version of the document (FRC 2014) reinforces FRC’s
desire to be a regulator ‘‘driven by evidence, fairness and
proportionality in deciding what action to take’’ and ‘‘to
report openly on these activities and the reasons for them’’
(pp. 3–4). Importantly, it also restates the agency’s com-
mitment to the conduct of IA as a means to ensure the
observance of the principles of transparency, accountabil-
ity, proportionality, consistency and targeted action.1 The
FRC’s current approach to IA is explained on its website
where the agency states that it follows the latest govern-
ment guidance on IA (BIS 2015) and also mentions three
guiding principles it adheres to in producing impact
assessments, namely:
• The work that goes into the production of an impact
assessment should be proportionate to the importance
of the proposal that it covers.
• Where a standard is being introduced as a direct
response to legislation or regulation, or as part of an
agreed policy commitment to adopt international stan-
dards of accounting or auditing, the impact assessment
should explain the rationale for introducing the stan-
dard and should focus on any aspects of the proposed
standard which augment the relevant legislation or
augment or diverge from the relevant international
standard.
where appropriate, we are particularly alert to the impact
of proposals on small businesses.2
FRC activities in general and, in particular, the conduct
of IA, are also subject to external oversight arrangements.
In particular, FRC’s policy-making practices are scruti-
nized periodically by the Better Regulation Executive
(BRE), a directorate established as a result of the Hampton
review within the government’s Department for Business,
Innovation and Skills (BIS) to lead the better regulation
agendas. Interestingly, in 2010, BRE published results of a
Hampton implementation review of FRC practices (BIS
2010), describing FRC’s governance practices as demon-
strating ‘‘a positive approach to better regulation’’ (p. 3).
Specifically, the procedures for public consultation were
found to be particularly strong, but the reviewers warned of
the dangers of ‘‘consultation overload’’ and suggested FRC
should set clearer priorities on the volume and content of
consultation (p. 12). The review also found that the FRC
needed to develop a more comprehensive approach to the
analysis of the costs and benefits of its proposals, and to
monitor better the accuracy of forecasted estimates. In
addition, as a regulator with a significant public interest
remit, FRC falls within the broader democratic account-
ability process and may, in principle, be held to account by
institutions such as the UK parliament, which has been
aptly described as having ‘an appetite for scrutiny of reg-
ulatory reform’ (Radaelli 2010, p. 99). For example, a
report by the House of Lords’ Select Committee (House of
Lords 2007) stated that regulators ‘‘should commit to
evaluating the impact of their work and monitoring the
1 The FRC’s experience of IA had a significant influence on the
development of the Position Paper on ‘‘Considering the Effects of
Accounting Standards’’ which was published by the European
Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) in June 2012. The
main elements of approach in that paper have been supported by a
wide range of standard setters in the area of financial reporting across
the European Union. Analysis of the explicit use of IA within the
FRC’s regulatory activities is therefore of relevance to understanding
the potential contribution IA can make to the broader field of financial
reporting regulation internationally.
2 See https://www.frc.org.uk/About-the-FRC/Procedures/FRC-opera
tional-policies/Impact-assessment.aspx (accessed 28th November
2016).
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extent to which they are providing value for money’’ (p.
36).
Evidence Base and Analytical Approach
to Assessing IA as an Accountability Tool
Evidence Base
We have reviewed the use of IA in all regulatory episodes
in the fields of accounting and auditing completed by FRC
over a ten-year period between January 2005 and Decem-
ber 2015 (see Appendix for a full list). We therefore focus
on the time following the widening of the FRC’s respon-
sibilities which led to the emergence of FRC as we know it
now, as the UK’s independent regulator for both account-
ing and auditing. By a ‘regulatory episode’ we identify any
consideration of policy-making or regulatory activity
leading to the issuance of new or revised regulations for
financial reporting or auditing. The total number of regu-
latory episodes reviewed is 43, including projects on the
development and revision of auditing and accounting
standards, and ethical standards for auditors. In each case,
the publication of consultation papers, discussion papers,
exposure drafts and standards are all taken as part of a
single regulatory episode but each new consideration of a
possible revision to existing standards is taken to constitute
a new episode. One of the authors served as a member of
one of the FRC’s Boards. As a result, we were able to
construct a comprehensive database of documentary
materials which serves as the main source of evidence for
our analysis. Additionally, we also benefitted from the
interviews with four individuals that held general respon-
sibilities within FRC for the conduct and oversight of IA.
The interviews represent secondary data source and were
used mainly as a means to gain a general understanding of
the organization of the IA process within FRC.
An Analytical Approach
Our analytical framework for assessing the efficacy of IA
as an accountability tool is presented in Fig. 1 and is based
on the work of Bovens (2006, 2007) which address
accountability as an object of inquiry. Specifically, in
Bovens’s view, assessment of any accountability mecha-
nism should comprise two considerations, namely: (1) an
evaluation of the procedures through which this type of
mechanism is enacted and (2) a systemic evaluation of the
overall purpose that it serves as well as its overall appro-
priateness. For the purpose of this study, the following
paragraphs will discuss how these two levels provide key
dimensions for our assessment of the efficacy of IA as an
accountability tool.
The procedural assessment, according to Bovens (2007,
p. 467), involves questions about the manner in which the
accountability mechanism supports the functionality of
what he termed ‘‘accountability phases’’, comprising: (1)
an information phase (proper provision of information
about an actor’s conduct); (2) a debating phase (proper
discussion and debate); and (3) a judgement phase (a
possibility for a proper judgement by the accountability
forum about the nature of policy making and its outcomes).
Bovens’s conceptualization of the accountability process
closely relates to that developed by Jordana et al. (2015,
p. 7) who mention answerability and enforceability as two
key characteristics of accountability, where the former is
‘‘based on information [and] dialogue’’ between the regu-
lator and the forum and the latter means judgements about
the regulator’s conduct.
IA literature shows that an evaluation of the procedural
quality of IA practices most commonly involves an
assessment of compliance with IA guidelines (Vibert 2004;
Renda 2006; Cecot et al. 2008; Dunlop et al. 2012). One of
the common methods of assessment used in these studies
has been a scorecard approach where a score is awarded
when a specific quality criterion is met, such as the
inclusion of estimated costs/benefits. While this form of
approach enables a generalized, measured assessment of
the use of IA and its overall quality, it often struggles to
provide a more nuanced understanding of the application of
particular IA procedures. In this study, we refer to the
provisions of UK government guidance on IA as a standard
of IA best practice with a particular focus on the provisions
relating to the procedures that facilitate the three
accountability phases (Bovens 2007). Rather than relying
solely on scorecards, we first relate adherence to the pro-
visions of IA guidance with the accountability enhancing
elements of IA (see below); this is then followed (in
‘‘Analysis’’ section) by an assessment of the FRC regula-
tory episodes to demonstrate the degree to which those
elements are executed and associated challenges (see Fraas
and Lutter 2011, for a similar approach).
As mentioned earlier in the paper, the UK government
guidance on IA that serves as a benchmark for our analysis
has been subject to a number of revisions since its first
publication in 1998 (Cabinet Office 1998, 2000, 2003; BIS
2011, 2015). While the content of those revisions has
varied, applying increasingly more detailed and prescrip-
tive recommendations, the general idea of what IA means
has not changed significantly. Specifically, the general
requirement has been that IA should involve a range of
steps, including: (1) identifying the policy problem, (2)
identifying desired policy objectives, (3) identifying viable
policy options that will achieve those objectives, (4)
identifying the impact of each of those options (both neg-
ative and positive), (5) valuing the costs and benefits
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related to each option and selecting the preferred option,
and (6) evaluating implemented policy. Further, since
2003, the guidance has also required that regulators
administer an open consultation which may occur at dif-
ferent points in the policy cycle (Cabinet Office 2003).
Steps 1 and 2, to a large extent, are determined by the
incidence of an accounting or auditing issue and by the
general objectives of FRC, and so are of less importance to
us. Step 6 is also outside the study’s scope because our
analysis is concerned with the use of IA up to the point at
which a regulatory outcome has been determined.
Thus, the primary focus of our assessment are steps 3, 4
and 5 as well as the public consultation element of IA, as
these provisions relate most closely to the accountability-
enhancing properties of IA discussed earlier. Specifically,
steps 3 and 4 relate to the capacity of IA to facilitate the
information phase of accountability (Bovens 2006, 2007)
by providing the forum with relevant information about the
policy options at hand, including the cost burden that each
option imposes as against the quantified benefits of
implementation and compliance. Further, the consultation
requirement contained in IA guidance highlights the
potential for IA to facilitate the debating phase of
accountability by enabling a discussion and dialogue
between the regulator and the forum to collect stakeholder
views on the key assumptions, estimates and evidence used
in policy making. And lastly, Step 5 may be seen as sup-
porting the judgement phase of accountability as it
demands that the regulator justifies the selection of a pre-
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of whether the benefits associated with it outweigh the cost
of implementation, so that the forum members are able to
form judgements about the appropriateness of the regula-
tor’s decision.
Our analysis has assessed all identified episodes in terms
of evidence of compliance with the steps of IA described
above (steps 3, 4, 5 and the public consolation require-
ment). As a result, we have identified three groups of
episodes, namely: (1) episodes with no elements present:
(2) episodes addressing some but not all elements, and (3)
episodes where all elements were present. Furthermore, in
addition to this generic classification of all episodes, we
also provide a more detailed narrative-style discussion of
illustrative episodes to exemplify the extent to which rel-
evant elements of IA have been applied and supporting
procedures followed in practice.
The second part of an accountability assessment,
according to Bovens (2006, 2007), should consider the
systemic effects and general purposes of a given account-
ability instrument. Applied to our case, such a systemic
assessment involves questions about IA itself and the
actual purpose it serves within FRC in light of the FRC’s
publicly declared commitment to transparency and
accountability. More specifically, Bovens (2007) suggests
that such questions should focus on the functional aspects
of the accountability arrangement and whether it yields
relevant information about the regulator’s conduct. A key
issue in this regard is whether IA provides policy stake-
holders constituting the FRC’s accountability forum with a
good understanding of the processes of rule formulation,
and more importantly, yields opportunities to influence the
regulator’s conduct and the direction of regulatory policy.
Another set of questions, according to Bovens
(2006, 2007), should seek to understand whether the
instrument (in this case, IA) has the potential to prevent the
abuse of power or situations where the regulator is able to
push through predetermined regulatory decisions. And
finally, questions should be asked about issues such as
education and learning and whether the accountability
arrangement involves effective feedback mechanisms to
stimulate a degree of reflexivity and self-criticism (Bovens
2007).
Analysis
Procedural Assessment of IA
As mentioned earlier, our analytical approach has revealed
three categories of regulatory episode reflecting the degree
to which they embed procedures that facilitate the three
accountability phases, i.e. information, debate and judge-
ment (Bovens 2006, 2007) (see Table 1).
Episodes Involving No IA
As shown in Table 1, the first group comprises 7 (out of
43) episodes where no IA was performed. The absence of
IA was usually justified by the FRC in an accompanying
statement suggesting that the policy proposals were not
seen as imposing any additional regulatory burden war-
ranting an impact assessment. However, our review of the
nature of the episodes in this group reveals many related to
new or significantly revised regulation, and hence the
expectation would be that those would need to be subjected
to IA. It has to be noted, however, that the majority of the
episodes were initiated during the early stages of IA
adoption and the subsequent pattern of application may be
taken to indicate a growing commitment to the use of IA in
more recent years.
Episodes Involving Partial IA
The second, largest group of episodes (24 out of 43)
exemplifies partial utilization of IA as an accountability
tool as it contains reference to some but not all account-
ability-enhancing elements of the instrument discussed in
the previous section. Table 1 provides an analysis of which
accountability-enhancing elements of IA (outlined in the
analytical framework above) are present in relation to
every episode in the group. It shows, in particular, the
FRC’s primary focus on the elements of IA relating to the
information and debating phases of accountability and the
absence of consideration of the judgement phase, that is,
attempts to provide a convincing justification for the
selection of the preferred policy option. Importantly, our
analysis reveals that, even where relevant IA elements are
present, the extent of their application, represented in the
procedural detail with which they are addressed, falls short
of the objectives of IA. It has to be recognized, however,
that the level of procedural execution of the relevant IA
steps has improved during the period under study, with
episodes concluded in later years usually featuring a more
sophisticated presentation and analysis. The discussion
below will provide a detailed, narrative procedural
assessment of examples of the episodes in the second group
to demonstrate the extent to which IA serves to address the
three accountability phases.
(i) With regards to the information phase of account-
ability (Bovens 2006, 2007), many episodes in the
group fail to provide adequate information about the
policy options considered. One significant weakness,
for example, is the quantification of costs and
benefits (i.e. economic impacts). Although the issue
of cost is recognized in a large number of episodes,
the published documents often lack detailed analysis
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Table 1 An overview of the use of IA as an accountability tool









1 Heritage Assets Information/Debate
2 FRS 20 None
3 FRSEE None
4 FRS 17 Information/Debate
5 FRS 25 Information/Debate
6 Half Year Financial Reports None
7 FRS 3 Information/Debate
8 Statement of principles for Financial Reporting:
Interpretation for Public Benefit Entities
None
9 FRS 8 Information/Debate
10 FRS 26 Information/Debate
11 FRS 20_2 Information/Debate
12 Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards
2008
Information/Debate
13 FRS 29 Debate
14 FRS 2, FRS 6 and FRS 28 Information/Debate
15 Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards
2009
Information/Debate
16 UIFT Abstract 42 and FRS 26 Information/Debate
17 The Future of UK GAAP/FRS 100, 101 and 102 All
18 FRS 25_2 Information/Debate
19 Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards
2010
Information/Debate
20 FRS 29_2 Debate
21 ESRA Information/Debate
22 ISRE 2410 Information/Debate
23 SIR 5000 None
24 SIR 2000 None
25 ISA 600 (UK and Ireland) Information/Debate
26 ISA 700 (UK and Ireland) Information/Debate
27 ISA 700 (UK and Ireland) Revised Information/Debate
28 Ethical Standards for Auditors Information/Debate
29 Ethical Standards for Auditors 2 None
30 ISA Clarity Project All
31 Changes to ISA 260, 570 and 700 in response to
Sharman Panel Recommendations
Information/Debate
32 FRS 103 All
33 FRC Abstract 1 All
34 FRS 102 (Revised) Debate
35 FRSSE (effective from 2008) (Revised) All
36 FRS 101 (Revised) All
37 FRS 102 (Revised) All
38 FRS 102 (Revised) All
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and developed categorization of costs and offer only
limited measurement. In the majority of cases, costs
are acknowledged simply as something on which one
needs to keep a watchful eye. In several accounting
episodes cost is covered by a somewhat generic
statement that ‘‘[i]n the ASB’s view, the proposals
should not impose significant additional costs of
preparation’’ (for example, Amendment to FRS 25,
Episode 18) but followed by an accompanying point
that the ASB ‘‘believes that the amendments will
result in information which is of benefit to users of
financial statements’’ or a conclusion that ‘‘the cost of
the proposed new requirements will not be dispropor-
tionate to their benefit’’. These documents thus
acknowledge the potential for costs to be incurred
but offer only a simple reasoned argument or state-
ment of belief that the policy is appropriate without
any supporting analysis. In addition, while the direct
cost of compliance with the proposed regulation (for
example, an increase in the amount of auditwork)may
be identified, second-order effects of such proposals
(for example, on market conditions and economic
development) are almost entirely ignored. An illus-
trative exception to this point is the development of
Standard for Investment Reporting (SIR) 5000
(Episode 23), where reference is made to the potential
cost on the functioning of the financial markets, but it
is simply concluded that the ‘‘incurring of undue
additional costs […] [was] a low risk’’.
Likewise, attempts to identify the benefits from pro-
posed regulations can be observed in only a handful of
episodes in this group. In such cases benefits were usually
identified by generic references to the expected improve-
ment in the standard of financial reporting and auditing
practice, rigorousness of internal processes, and ultimately,
the quality of their outcomes. Some cases discussed ben-
efits linked to the objective of minimizing the cost burden
on the recipients of regulation, e.g. auditors. An example is
the statement that ‘‘auditors may find it necessary to
advance in time some procedures that would otherwise be
performed later in the year for the audit of the next annual
financial statements’’, which ‘‘would increase the costs
attributable to the review but these should be offset by a
related reduction in costs attributable to the year-end audit’’
(Exposure Draft for ISRE 2410 (Episode 22)). However,
any benefits identified are discussed mainly in terms of the
intended effect of a policy option and not in terms of the
quantified economic value of this effect. The absence of
quantified values for costs and benefits associated with
policy options illustrates the limited nature of information
about the policy alternatives supplied by the regulator
(FRC). This is likely to mean that the FRC’s accountability
forum members will encounter significant difficulties when
trying to assess the appropriateness of the regulator’s
decisions and policy choices, given that such an assessment
should, in principal, be based on the comparative overview
of economic impacts of the regulatory proposals consid-
ered (Bovens 2007).
(ii) As far as the debating phase is concerned, our
analysis indicates a presence of public consultation
in all episodes in this group (see Table 1). How-
ever, there is evidence that consultation is often
used not as a means of providing transparency on
the nature of information supporting regulatory
decision-making but rather as a means to obtain
this information. Specifically, the text of consulta-
tion papers and exposure drafts often contain not
only invitations to comment on the existing policy
proposals but also to effectively participate in
supplying knowledge that the regulator can then
use to properly articulate the policy alternatives. A
specific example of this type of approach is
contained in the following extract:
Regulatory Impact
6. In the ASB’s view, the proposals set out in this FRED
[Financial Reporting Exposure Draft—authors] should not
impose significant additional costs of preparation. The ASB
believes that the amendments will result in information
Table 1 continued









39 FRS 104 All
40 FRS 101 (Revised) Debate
41 Implementation of EU Accounting Directive All
42 FRS 102 (Revised) All
43 Client Asset Assurance Standard All
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which is of benefit to users of the financial statements. The
ASB, however, would welcome views on whether there are
any significant costs resulting from these proposals and, if
so whether they can be quantified. The ASB would also
welcome views on whether the benefits arising from the
proposals in this FRED outweigh the costs involved.
Invitation to Comment
Question 5 The ASB considers the benefits of implementing
the proposals in this FRED outweigh the costs involved. Do
you agree? If not, why not? It would be helpful if any
significant cost that would arise on implementation of the
proposals could be identified and quantified. (Extracts from
FRED: Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards
2009 (Episode 15))
This somewhat routinized approach found in most pol-
icy proposals highlights that reliance is placed on the
principle of consultation mainly to serve reputational
objectives. It may also suggest recognition of the need to
adhere to, and demonstrate adherence to, the principles of
accountability and transparency through an open debate but
only by acknowledging the issue in a relatively formulaic
and limited way.
(iii) The above potential weaknesses regarding the
provision of information comprehensively detail-
ing the economic impacts of policy options
considered have a detrimental effect on the func-
tionality of the judgement phase of accountability
(Bovens 2007), and specifically, the possibility for
the accountability forum to make informed judg-
ments about the appropriateness of the regulator’s
decisions and claims. In particular, no episodes in
this group (see Table 1) show evidence of FRC
following step 5 of the IA process, which involves
providing a rationalization for the selection of the
preferred policy alternative. One example is
Episode 25 that has to do with a regulatory
response to the issuance by the IAASB (Interna-
tional Auditing and Assurance Standards Board) of
a clarified version of ISA (International Standard
on Auditing) 600. In a Discussion Paper, the
regulator seeks stakeholders’ comments on three
possible actions: (1) early adoption of the ISA; (2)
converting the Standard to a (non-binding) Prac-
tice Note, a form of document usually used to
illustrate best practice rather than introduce new
requirements; and (3) a nil option of delaying
adoption until the IAASB implemented the full
suite of clarified ISAs. The discussion of the
options is then followed by an analysis of their
likely benefits and quantified measures of cost.
However, the IA documents contain no attempt to
develop, on the basis of that discussion, an
evidence-based rationalization of the thought pro-
cesses in support of its preferred policy. What may
partly explain FRC’s reluctance, at least in relation
to some episodes, to utilize IA as a means to
provide greater clarity on the regulatory rationale
is the fact that, in many such cases, there is only
really one available policy option that is realistic,
for example, in the case of adoption of interna-
tional standards to which there is already a general
commitment or legal requirement. Therefore, the
requirement to satisfy the need for IA is itself
problematic and it can be difficult to see precisely
on what basis informed discussion of policy
options can take place.
Episodes Involving Full IA
In the last group of episodes (12 out of 43, see Table 1) are
those that cover a full range of accountability-related ele-
ments of IA and hence represent more comprehensive
attempts to utilize IA as an accountability instrument. The
number of such episodes has increased during the period
under study. This may indicate a growing perceived
importance of IA in the FRC’s regulatory process in gen-
eral and, in particular, a greater emphasis on the potential
of IA for enhancing the agency’s accountability and
legitimacy. We have selected one episode in this group for
a detailed discussion on the basis that it relates to one of the
most significant policy projects undertaken by FRC during
the period studied—the Future of UK Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP). The discussion is designed
to not only illustrate a changing commitment to IA from a
procedural perspective but also to demonstrate that chal-
lenges still remain in applying IA to the context of financial
reporting regulation, even in cases where IA is given a full
and comprehensive consideration.
The Future of UK GAAP episode concerns the future
regime of national accounting standards in the light of
convergence with International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRS), and particularly the requirements that should
apply to smaller- and medium-sized enterprises (Episode
17). This is an area of particular significance for financial
reporting as it involves the question of maintaining sepa-
rate national accounting standards and the applicability of
IFRS beyond listed entities. As a consequence, it has not
been an easy area to regulate. The history of the ASB’s
consideration in this case has involved several discussion
documents, consultations and exposure drafts and can be
traced back to a Discussion Paper issued in 2004, which
provided a wide ranging consideration of the issue but
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contained only limited reference to anything specifically
relating to identified costs, benefits or burdens. At this
stage the FRC was only adopting its new Regulatory
Strategy and IA may not have been a major consideration
in the development of the Discussion Paper.
A more recent Consultation Paper in 2009 went further
in trying to identify the number of entities that could be
affected by different national GAAP requirements and the
invitation to comment included a request for identification
of both costs and benefits. That consultation was followed
by two Exposure Drafts (FREDs 43 and 44) in 2010 which
proposed that a three-tier financial reporting framework
would apply to different types and sizes of entity based on
a concept of ‘‘public accountability’’. The FREDs incor-
porated a draft impact assessment at some 75 pages in
length which was accompanied by outreach activities
involving meetings with audit firms, preparers, investors
and others to raise awareness of the proposals. The out-
come of that consultation was that in 2011 ASB indicated
that it was re-deliberating its proposals. The concept of
public accountability was dropped but the underlying ideas
of a tiered system of requirements and of reduced disclo-
sure for certain enterprises would continue to be followed.
In January 2012, three new exposure drafts (FREDs 46, 47
and 48) were published, incorporating a revised and
reduced impact assessment. Three new standards were
issued in late 2012 (FRSs 100 and 101) and early 2013
(FRS 102) to implement the proposals in the exposure
drafts, together with a final IA document which (apart from
some changes to refer to standards rather than drafts and
the use of terminology of ‘‘cost-benefit analysis’’ rather
than ‘‘evidence’’) largely replicated the content of the
revised IA accompanying the January 2012 FREDs.
As noted above, the proposals exposed in 2010 were
accompanied by a very detailed IA. Notable features of the
draft IA include a discussion of alternative courses of
action and why they are considered inappropriate, identi-
fication of costs associated with each of the policy alter-
natives, and a detailed discussion of benefits (although it is
also stated that the benefits are impossible to quantify in a
realistic way). Overall, it is concluded that the benefits
outweigh the costs of the proposals. It is apparent that a
considerable amount of effort had been devoted to trying to
conduct the IA in a detailed, systematic and appropriate
way. Notwithstanding that degree of development of IA,
the responses to FRC proposals from the stakeholders (who
can be considered to constitute members of the account-
ability forum—Bovens (2006, 2007)) forced the regulator
to rethink at least some aspects of its intended policy and
significant changes were reflected in the proposals brought
forward in the January 2012 FREDs, including dropping
the concept of public accountability as a basis for differ-
entiating entities.
Although the above process may suggest that the
incorporation of the IA in the public consultation was seen
by some members of the FRC’s accountability forum as a
means to influence policy development, such a view was
not universally shared. This is clearly evident from the
Feedback Statement associated with the revised IA docu-
ment published in 2012, which presented stakeholder
responses to a number of specific questions designed to
capture their views of the IA itself (see Table 2 for a
summary of responses). It is striking that only a minority of
commentators chose to submit a response to the IA ques-
tions, suggesting that most did not regard the IA as the
critical basis on which to either evaluate the proposals or
make representations for alternatives. Further, within the
minority of commentators who did address the IA ques-
tions, it is apparent that only small proportions expressed
agreement with the propositions put forward by ASB
making reference to the IA as support for their proposals.
A notable feature of the revised IA which accompanied
the 2012 exposure drafts and 2012/13 standards is that it is
a significantly shorter document (compared to the 2010
draft) and adopts a different approach to the presentation of
evidence on costs and benefits. The FRC’s approach to
identifying and measuring costs and the discussion of
benefits changes radically. Although some additional sce-
narios of impact on different types of reporting organiza-
tion are introduced, none of them includes quantified
estimates of costs, and the illustrative scenarios are moved
from the main evidence text to an appendix. The discussion
includes a statement that ‘‘it is not possible to determine
with any degree of accuracy an average cost or even a
meaningful range of costs for entities implementing the
Standards’’ (Impact Assessment 2013, para 6.12). Some-
what paradoxically, however, the FRC goes on to refer to
the total estimated cost of £80 m calculated in the original
(2010) IA. The approach to the evaluation of benefits is
also significantly different and the amount of discussion of
economic factors such as the impact of new information on
companies’ cost of capital in largely removed.
The differences between the original (2010) IA and the
revised IA accompanying the 2012 and 2013 documents,
and particularly the move away from detailed quantifica-
tion, may indicate the intention of the FRC to avoid having
to defend (being held accountable for) financial estimates
that could be criticized as speculative as the justification of
its policy choice, or creating a basis whereby the decisions
reached could be challenged more explicitly. This raises
concerns not only about the manner in which IA is used to
support the information phase of regulatory accountability
but also about the extent to which it can be relied upon by
the accountability forum in their judgements about the
validity of the regulator’s actions and decisions (the judg-
ment phase) (Bovens 2007). Furthermore, this episode also
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demonstrates that the FRC places significant reliance on
the principle of public consultation, arguably to demon-
strate commitment to the debating element of account-
ability. It appears, however, that the purpose of
consultation is mainly to demonstrate participation, and to
convey an impression that policy recipients are listened to.
This kind of approach is also evident in many other epi-
sodes (e.g. Episodes 35–43) (see Table 1). However, as
Bovens (2007) argues, participation alone does not con-
stitute a genuine form of accountability as it often lacks
‘‘the element of justification, judgement and conse-
quences’’ (p. 453). This observation is particularly relevant
to FRC because, as this and other episodes analysed show,
the duty to provide information is often delegated to
members of the accountability forum, and particularly
public practice accountancy firms as the main recipients of
regulation. Consultation processes give a rather limited
degree of clarity on the thought process behind the regu-
latory changes proposed. In other words, rather than
facilitating a debate on the appropriateness of regulatory
choices, the instrument of IA is relied upon as a means of
articulating those choices. Our analysis shows in this
regard that, particularly in case of more recent regulatory
episodes (e.g. Episodes 35–43), the FRC opted for what
might be called ‘‘consultation stage impact assessment’’
providing rather limited information relating to the costs
and benefits of regulatory options considered and looking
to policy stakeholders to supply much of this information.
Systemic Assessment of IA as a Regulatory
Accountability Tool
The findings of the procedural evaluation of IA as an
accountability instrument presented in the previous section
point to a trend towards a more routine and also, at least in
relation to some episodes, more sophisticated use of the
instrument within FRC during the period analysed, which
suggests a growing momentum for IA. However, the
findings also give rise to a number of systemic issues and
concerns. Specifically, we have not found evidence to
establish conclusively that IA does indeed deliver on its
objectives by producing better, more accountable and
transparent governance practices. If anything, our findings
seem to point to the opposite, that, in the words of Coletti
and Radaelli (2013, p. 1065), IA is used to ‘‘change ends
with the means’’ or, in other words, to create a perception
of accountability by presenting a growing use of IA as a
main objective. Our analysis reveals, for example, that,
even where IA is formally embedded in the policy process
(Groups 2 and 3 in the above analysis), a closer assessment
of the extent of execution reveals partial application and
what looks like a box-ticking exercise rather than a
meaningful utilization of IA as an accountability
instrument. Furthermore, another systemic feature of the
IA process within FRC is its heavy reliance on public
consultation (also noted in the review of the FRC’s IA
practices by the UK’s regulatory oversight executive—
BRE 2010). Consultation procedures may lead to greater
accountability through enhanced answerability and
observability of the process of policy making (Jordana
et al. 2015; Bovens 2006, 2007; Mulgan 2003) and facili-
tate a dialogue between the regulator and forum actors.
However, the manner in which consultation is adminis-
trated by FRC indicates a possibility that IA may be used to
project a desired image rather than to enhance stakeholder
participation. Jordana et al. (2015) argue that, to operate as
meaningful accountability mechanisms, consultation pro-
cesses ‘‘must go beyond sheer information and include
debate, namely the possibility of posing questions by the
respective accountability forum and providing responses’’
(p. 8). Our analysis indicates that FRC does see consulta-
tion as a formal means for collecting stakeholder feedback
but makes limited attempt to show how those opinions
collected have actually been addressed during policy
deliberation and with what consequences for the content of
policy outcomes. It is plausible that the low level of
stakeholder participation during consultation evident in
some regulatory episodes analysed (such as the Future of
the UK GAAP) is a direct consequence of this approach by
FRC.
The inconsistent content of information communicated
to forum members through the use of IA presents another
factor hindering the possibility of an effective dialogue
between them and the regulator. Examples include the lack
of consideration of alternative courses of action (policy
options) and the difficulties with providing measured
assessments of the economic impacts of regulation. Also,
even where this type of cost-benefit analysis is present, it
tends to focus predominantly on the consequences for
particular members of the forum, most notably accounting
practitioners, to the exclusion of other, possibly significant
‘‘second-order’’ impacts on, for example, the users of
accounting/audit reports or indeed the broader economy.
This approach seems to be in conflict with one of the
central arguments for IA that by making costs and benefits
explicit the interests of all entities subject to regulation are
accounted for (Renda 2006).
Weaknesses in the information element of accountabil-
ity (Bovens 2007) administered through IA limit signifi-
cantly the capacity of IA to become an effective tool for
enhancing forum members’ substantive understanding of
the regulator’s conduct, its approach to policy formulation,
and the likely consequences of its policies. These obser-
vations echo Bovens’s (2007) contention that the potential
of an accountability instrument (such as IA) to enhance
stakeholders’ judgements about the regulator’s conduct
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(the judgment phase of accountability) is directly and
inextricably linked to the functionality of the other two
(information and debating) phases. It has to be noted,
however, that the extent to which IA provides a detailed
‘‘visualization’’ of the regulatory process so as to increase
its transparency is not always solely a matter at the regu-
lator’s discretion. The often significant (human) cost of
carrying out IA may detract from using the instrument in a
comprehensive manner, especially in cases considered to
be dealing with relatively insignificant policy issues.
The procedural assessment of IA as an accountability
instrument also casts doubt as to its effectiveness as a tool
for preventing the abuse of (legislative) power that, as
Bovens (2006) noted, should be one of the desired systemic
objectives of any accountability arrangement. Instead, our
assessment shows that FRC’s approach to IA may poten-
tially indicate, at least in some cases, attempts to justify and
provide a scientific underpinning to the predetermined
policy decisions. These concerns echo those expressed by
Schrefler (2010, 2013) (discussed earlier) which point to
independent regulators often opting for what she terms
‘‘strategic substantiating’’ usage of knowledge and evidence
(produced through IA) in support of the pre-selected policy
options. While we do not discount the possibility that IA
may also be utilized by FRC in a way which enhances the
regulator’s and the forum members’ substantive under-
standing of the policy issues at hand (the instrumental use of
IA described by Schrefler 2010, 2013), we also need to at
least acknowledge other possible motivations, such as a
focus on IA as an instrument to promote perceptions of the
knowledge intensity of the regulatory process, critical for
the legitimacy of independent regulatory actors.
Further, there is clearly scope for FRC to exercise much
more reflection and self-criticism when applying IA so as
to enable it to be a tool for ‘‘social learning’’ where policy
makers as well as recipients of regulation ‘‘gain a clear
sense of the options, and trade-offs’’ and understand and
make judgements about the consequences of solutions
(Jacobs 2006, p. 18). Our study may be taken as an
empirical illustration of prior claims that an economic
model of IA may potentially produce poor learning results
(Coletti and Radaelli 2013). Nonetheless, it should be
acknowledged that understanding, debating and judging the
impact of policy measures in the area of financial reporting,
which are themselves developed with a fair degree of
abstraction, is a challenging task. This raises questions
about the format of IA rules and, specifically, whether they
should be designed in an abstract way which can address
this complexity, irrespective of the policy context, actors,
or issues at hand, or alternatively, contain carefully for-
mulated definitions of preferred treatments to aid applica-
tion. Resolving the principles vs. rules dilemma in the
context of IA ultimately boils down to a balancing act
between the risk of the assessment becoming a dull, overly-
prescriptive and therefore artificial instrument and the need
to gradually increase the usefulness of IA as a tool for
making regulators answerable to their ultimate audiences
by reducing the number of ‘unknowns’.
Conclusion
This study adds to prior research which has examined the
use and overall quality of IA in the context of governmental
and inter-governmental agencies (Jacobs 2005 and 2006;
Radaelli 2010; Dunlop et al. 2012) by providing a specific
focus on the properties of IA as a regulatory accountability
tool, with an emphasis on a non-governmental regulatory
setting. Our analysis has involved both a procedural
assessment of the execution of the accountability-enhancing
elements of IA (outlined in our analytical approach in
‘‘Evidence Base and Analytical Approach to Assessing IA
as an Accountability Tool’’ section) and a more systemic
evaluation of the roles of IA as an accountability tool within
FRC. In particular, we have combined a general assessment
of the execution of the accountability-related steps of IA in
all episodes identified with a more nuanced, narrative dis-
cussion of individual episodes. This has enabled us to
analyse the extent of IA application and to show more
clearly that, even where all relevant steps were formally
identified in IA discussions in the FRC documents published
in connection with individual episodes, the procedural
quality of execution of those steps varied considerably. In
particular, we have reported shortcomings relating to issues
such as the provision of reliable and complete information
about the rationale behind policy decisions and the regula-
tor’s over-reliance on public consultation procedures. In
summary, our findings suggest that the direct contribution of
IA to enhancing FRC’s accountability has been limited.
While the FRC has recognized the imperative for IA, the
practicalities and difficulties of implementation have led to
numerous weaknesses in its application.
Our findings contribute to both accountability and IA
literatures in a number of ways. Firstly, our study directly
responds to calls for a better understanding of account-
ability arrangements in a regulatory setting. Prior literature
has described a lack of research into the functionality of
those arrangements as ‘‘paradoxical’’, specifically in the
context of new delegated forms of regulation, and has
pointed out the importance of ‘‘both wider democratic
control and closer supervision by political representatives
over these new modes of regulatory governance’’ (Jordana
et al. 2015, p. 256). Claims of autonomy, independence,
and knowledge intensity characteristic of private non-
governmental regulatory agencies have shaped greatly their
approaches to accountability through, among other things,
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promoting a greater emphasis on output-focused instru-
ments (Schrefler 2010; Jordana et al. 2015). Our study has
subjected to scrutiny the practices and procedures by which
regulatory accountability is enabled by reference to one
such instrument and, by doing so, contributed some further
insights to add to a growing academic debate into regula-
tory accountability not only as a virtue but also an object of
analytical enquiry (Bovens 2006, 2007; Jordana et al. 2015;
Righettini and Grimaldi 2015).
Secondly, we have provided a nuanced rationalization and
empirical illustration of IA in terms of its capacity to enhance
regulatory accountability. While the IA literature has provided
convincing explanations of the various uses of IA (Radaelli
2010; Dunlop et al. 2012), the accountability-related properties
of the instrument and the role that it can play in facilitating
broader transparency and answerability have not been explored
ingreat depth. Inparticular,wehave shownhowIA is capable of
contributing to all three elements identified in prior literature as
essential components of an effective accountability relationship,
namely information, debate and justification (Mulgan 2003;
Bovens2006, 2007; Jordanaet al. 2015).However, despite these
capabilities implicit in IA, the case of FRCdemonstrates that the
meaning of accountability is fluid and subject to interpretation,
as regulators seek to emphasize the importance of particular
accountability elements depending on their specific objectives
and constraints. The presence of public consultation in the
majority of episodes analysed and, at the same time, the per-
vasive lack of clarity on either the supporting evidence for or the
subsequent impact of those consultation procedures on policy
point to FRC prioritizing the social (debating) aspects of
accountability while downplaying the importance of the other
two elements (information and justification). While there is
evidence emerging of a more comprehensive use of IA within
FRC in recent years, considerate remains premature to conclude
that this offers a complete ‘‘accountability relationship’’
administered through IA (Mulgan 2003).
Lastly, our findings provide an insight into the dynamics
of IA in a non-governmental regulatory setting largely
overlooked in the prior IA literature, which has focused
primarily on governmental and cross-governmental orga-
nizations (with a few exceptions—see, for example, Fraas
and Lutter 2011). While our findings echo those by Fraas
and Lutter (2011) who reported a tendency for mechanical
application of IA for the purposes of regulatory compliance
among independent regulators in the U.S (Fraas and Lutter
2011, p. 2), we offer important additional insights into the
particular motivations behind IA in a non-governmental
regulatory context. In particular, the focus on IA has enabled
us to show the particular procedures through which IRAs
seek to convince their forum members of the inherent
knowledge-intensity of their policy making, which is critical
to their public acceptance and authority (Maggetti 2010).
Our analysis reveals the procedural limitations in the
implementation of IA as a knowledge resource and the pre-
dominantly strategic rationales (Schrefler 2010, 2013)
underpinning its use. In particular, the often formulaic
approach to evidence gathering administered as part of the
IA process points to a possibility that IA may be used to
validate predetermined policy decisions and reduce the
likelihood of those decisions being challenged either by the
political principle (the relevant government executive body)
or stakeholders such as the groups subject to regulation.
While this potentially points to the strong motivation for IA
as an instrument for greater political acceptance, the possi-
bility of instrumental use of IA (to enhance the regulator’s
and the forum members’ substantive understanding of the
policy issues) should not be discounted (Schrefler 2010).
That possibility clearly depends on the regulator’s ability to
obtain and intelligibly process knowledge but, as the case of
the FRC demonstrates, can be constrained substantially by
the very nature of the policy dilemmas and, particularly, the
principles-based nature of financial reporting regulation. The
contribution of IA to regulatory decision-making is affected
by the inherent limitations of the instrument as well as the
manner of its application by a regulatory agency. The ideals
and principles underlying political commitment to IA may
themselves be valid, but the realities of IA implementation
highlight a discrepancy between what IA prescribes and
what is achievable in principle, making IA a limited tool for
regulatory accountability in the context of independent
regulation of accounting and auditing.
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Table 3 Regulatory episodes and related policy documents
1 Heritage Assets
DP January 2006 Discussion Paper Heritage Assets: can accounting do better?
ED December 2006 Financial Reporting Exposure Draft Accounting for
Heritage Assets (FRED 40)
ED June 2008 Financial Reporting Exposure Draft Heritage Assets (FRED 42)
S June 2009 FRS 30 Heritage Assets
2 FRS 20
ED March 2006 Amendment to FRS 20 (IFRS 2) Share-based Payment Vesting Conditions and Cancellations
S March 2008 Amendment to FRS 20 (IFRS 2) Share-based Payment Vesting Conditions and Cancellations
3 FRSSE
ED April 2006 Amendment to FRSSE
S January 2007 FRSSE (effective January 2007)
S June 2008 FRSSE (effective April 2008)
S July 2013 FRSEE (effective January 2015)
4 FRS 17
ED May 2006 Proposed Amendment to FRS 17 Retirement Benefits and Reporting Statement
Retirement Benefits—Disclosures
S Dec 2006 Amendment to FRS17 Retirement Benefits
RS January 2007 Reporting Statement Retirement Benefits—Disclosures
5 FRS 25
ED July 2006 Amendment to FRS 25 (IAS 32) Financial Instruments: Presentation Financial
Instruments Puttable at Fair Value and Obligations Arising on Liquidation
ED March 2008 Proposed Amendment to FRS 25 Financial Instruments: Presentation Puttable
Financial Instruments and Obligations Arising on Liquidation
S August 2008 Amendment to FRS 25 Financial Instruments: Presentation Puttable Financial
Instruments and Obligations Arising on Liquidation
6 Half-yearly financial reports
ED February 2007 Statement Half-yearly financial reports
RS July 2007 Half-yearly financial reports
7 FRS 3
ED March 2007 Proposed Amendment to FRS 3 Reporting Financial Performance
CP April 2007 Consultation Paper: IASB Exposure Draft of a proposed IFRS for SMEs
S July 2007 Amendment to FRS 3 Reporting Financial Performance
8 Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting: Interpretation for Public Benefit Entities
DP May 2003 Discussion Paper Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting: Proposed
Interpretation for Public Benefit Entities
ED August 2005 Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting: Proposed Interpretation
for Public Benefit Entities
RS June 2007 Interpretation of the Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting:
Interpretation for Public Benefit Entities
9 FRS 8
ED July 2007 FRED 41 Related Party Disclosures
ED October 2007 Exposure Draft Amendments to FRS 26 (IAS 36)
S December 2008 Amendment to FRS 8 Related Party Disclosures: Legal Changes 2008




ED October 2007 Exposure Draft Amendments to FRS 26 (IAS 36)
ED October 2007 Amendment to FRS 20 (IFRS 2) Share-based payment—Group
Cash-settled Share-based Payment Transactions
S November 2008 Amendment to FRS 26 (IAS 39) Financial Instruments:
Recognition and Measurement Eligible Hedged Items
11 FRS 20_2
ED January 2008 Amendment FRS 20 (IFRS 2) Share-based payment—Group
Cash-settled Share-based Payment Transactions
S August 2009 Amendment FRS 20 (IFRS 2) Share-based payment—Group
Cash-settled Share-based Payment Transactions
12 Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards 2008
ED June 2008 FRED Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards
S December 2008 Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards
13 FRS 29
ED November 2008 Proposed Amendments to FRS 29 (IFRS 7) Financial Instruments
Disclosures—Improvements to Financial Instruments Disclosures.
S May 2009 Amendments to FRS 29 ‘Improving Disclosures about Financial Instruments’
14 FRS 2, FRS 6, and FRS 28
ED December 2008 Amendments to FRS 2 Accounting for Subsidiary Undertakings,
FRS 6 Acquisitions and Mergers, and FRS 28 Corresponding Amounts
S June 2009 Amendments to FRS 2, FRS 6, and FRS 28
15 Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards 2009
ED June 2009 FRED Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards 2009
S December 2009 Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards 2009
16 UITF Abstract 42 and FRS 26
ED June 2009 FRED Proposed Amendments to UITF Abstract 42 and FRS 26
(IAS 39) Embedded Derivatives
S September 2009 Amendments to UITF Abstract 42 and FRS 26 (IAS 39)
Embedded Derivatives
17 The Future of UK GAAP
CP August 2009 Policy Proposal: The Future of UK GAAP
ED October 2010 The Future of Financial Reporting—Part One: Explanation FRED 43
Application of Financial Reporting Standards & FRED 44 Financial
Reporting for Medium-sized Entities
ED October 2010 The Future of Financial Reporting—Part Two: Draft Financial Reporting Standards
ED October 2010 The Future of Financial Reporting—Appendices
ED March 2011 FRED 45 Financial Reporting Standard for Public Benefit Entities (FRSPE)
ED January 2012 Revised Exposure Drafts FRED 46 Application of Financial Reporting
Requirements, FRED 47 Reduced Disclosure Framework & FRED 48
The Financial Reporting Standard applicable in the UK and Republic of Ireland
S November 2012 FRS 100 Application of Financial Reporting Requirements
(and consequential amendments to FRSSE; FRS101 Reduced Disclosure Framework
S March 2013 FRS 102 The Financial Reporting Standard applicable in the UK and Republic of Ireland
IA March 2013 Impact assessment in relation to the issuance of FRS 100, 101, 102
FB March 2013 Feedback statement in relation to FRED 46, 47 and 48




ED November 2009 FRED Proposed Amendment to FRS 25 (IAS 32) Financial
Instruments: Presentation—Classification of Rights Issues.
S January 2010 Amendment to FRS 25 (IAS 32) Financial Instruments:
Presentation—Classification of Rights Issues
19 Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards 2010
ED June 2010 FRED Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards 2010
S November 2010 Improvements to Financial Reporting Standards 2010
20 FRS 29_2
ED February 2011 FRED Proposed Amendments to FRS 29 (IFRS 7) Financial
Instruments: Disclosures: Disclosures—Transfers of Financial Assets.
S July 2011 Amendments to FRS 29 (IFRS 7) Financial Instruments: Disclosures:
Disclosures—Transfers of Financial Assets.
21 ESRA
DP January 2006 Exposure Draft Ethical Standards for Reporting Accountants
FB 2006 Feedback on Responses to Consultation
S October 2006 Ethical Standards for Reporting Accountants
22 ISRE 2410
ED January 2007 Exposure Draft: ISRE 2410 Review of Interim Financial Information
Performed by the Independent Auditor of the Entity.
FB 2007 Feedback on Responses
S July 2007 ISRE 2410 Review of Interim Financial Information Performed by
the Independent Auditor of the Entity
23 SIR 5000
ED May 2007 ED of SIR 5000 Investment Reporting Standards Applicable to Public
Reporting Engagements on Financial Information Reconciliations
FB February 2008 Feedback on responses
S February 2008 SIR 5000 Investment Reporting Standards Applicable to Public Reporting
Engagements on Financial Information Reconciliations
24 SIR 2000
DP September 2010 SIR 2000 Investment Reporting Standards Applicable to Public Reporting
Engagements on Historical Financial Information
FB 2011 Feedback on responses
S March 2011 Revised SIR 2000 Investment Reporting Standards Applicable to Public
Reporting Engagements on Historical Financial Information
25 ISA 600 (UK and Ireland)
DP December 2007 Discussion of ISA 600 The work of Related Auditors and Other Auditors in
the Audit of Group Financial Statements
S April 2008 ISA 600 (UK and Ireland) The work of Related Auditors and Other Auditors
in the Audit of Group Financial Statements
26 ISA 700 (UK and Ireland)
DP December 2007 Auditor’s Report: Time for Change?
FB October 2008 Feedback paper: Auditor’s Report: Time for change?
ED September 2008 ED of ISA 700 (UK and Ireland) The Auditor’s Report on Financial Statements
FB September 2008 Feedback paper on ED
S March 2009 ISA 700 (UK and Ireland) The Auditor’s Report on Financial Statements
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Table 3 continued
27 ISA 700 (UK and Ireland) Revised
ED September 2010 ED of ISA 700 (UK and Ireland) The Auditor’s Report on
Financial Statements
FB 2010 Feedback paper on ED
S February 2011 Amended ISA 700 (UK and Ireland) The Auditor’s Report on
Financial Statements
DP February 2013 Revision to ISA 700 (UK and Ireland)
FS June 2013 Feedback paper on DP
S June 2013 Revised ISA 700 (UK and Ireland) The Independent Auditor’s
Report on Financial Statements
28 Ethical Standards for Auditors
Spring 07 Review of Ethical Standards for Auditors
ED October 2007 Amendments to the Ethical Standards
FB/S April 08 Feedback Paper on ED and Revised Ethical Standards.
29 Ethical Standards for Auditors 2
ED March 2009 ED of Revised Ethical Standards No. 1 Integrity, Objectivity and Independence,
No. 2 Financial, Business, employment and Personal Relationships,
No. 3 Long Association with the Audit Engagement, No. 4 Fees,
Remuneration and Evaluation policies, Litigation, Gifts and Hospitality,
No. 5 Non-audit Services Provided to Audited Entities
S October 2009 Revised Ethical Standard 3 Long Association with the Audit Engagement
FB October 2009 Feedback on Responses to March 2009 Consultation
S July 2010 Revised Ethical Standards No. 1 Integrity, Objectivity and Independence,
No. 2 Financial, Business, employment and Personal Relationships,
No. 4 Fees, Remuneration and Evaluation policies, Litigation,
Gifts and Hospitality, No. 5 Non-audit Services Provided to Audited Entities
30 ISA Clarity project
DP October 2008 Consultation on whether UK and Irish auditing standards should
be updated for the new (clarified) ISAs.
March 2009 APB announces intention to update ISAs (UK and Ireland)
ED April 2009 ED of Clarified ISAs (UK and Ireland)
FB October 2009 Feedback on responses to ED.
S October 2009 Clarified ISAs (UK and Ireland)
31 Changes to ISA 260, 570 and 700 in response to Sharman Panel Recommendations
DP January 2013 Implementing the Recommendations of the Sharman panel
FB November 2013 Implementing the Recommendations of the Sharman panel
S September 2014 ISA 260, 570 and 700 (Revised)
32 FRS 103
ED July 2013 FRED 49 Draft FRS 103 Insurance Contracts
ED July 2013 Exposure Draft of Implementation Guidance to accompany FRC 103
IA, FB March 2014 Impact Assessment and Feedback Statement for FRS 103
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Table 3 continued
33 FRC Abstract 1
DP August 2013 FRED 50 Draft FRC Abstract 1 Residential Management
Companies’ Financial Statements
IA, FB July 2015 Impact Assessment and Feedback Statement relating to
FRED 50, 57, 58, 59, 60 and 61
34 FRS 102 (Revised)
ED November 2013 FRED 51 Draft Amendments to FRS 102 The Financial Reporting
Standard applicable in the UK and Republic of Ireland: Hedge Accounting
35 FRSSE (effective from 2008) (Revised)
ED December 2013 FRED52 Draft Amendments to FRSSE (effective 2008) Micro-entities
IA April 2014 Impact Assessment and Feedback Statement
S April 2014 FRSSE (Revised) (effective January 2015)
36 FRS 101 (Revised)
ED December 2013 FRED 53 Draft Amendments to FRS 101 Reduced Disclosure Framework
IA, FB July 2014 Impact Assessment and Feedback Statement
S July 2014 FRS 101 (Revised) Reduced Disclosure Framework
37 FRS 102 (Revised)
ED February 2014 FRED 54 Draft Amendments to FRS 102 The Financial Reporting
Standard applicable in the UK and Republic of Ireland: Basic
Financial Instruments
IA July 2014 Impact Assessment
S July 2014 FRS 102 (Revised) The Financial Reporting Standard applicable
in the UK and Republic of Ireland
38 FRS 102 (Revised)
ED August 2014 FRED 55 Draft Amendments to FRS 102 The Financial Reporting
Standard applicable in the UK and Republic of Ireland: Pension Obligations
IA, FB February 2015 Impact Assessment and Feedback Statement
S February 2015 FRS 102 (Revised) The Financial Reporting Standard applicable in
the UK and Republic of Ireland
39 FRS 104
ED November 2014 FRED 56 Draft FRS 104 Interim Financial Reporting
IA, FB March 2014 Impact Assessment and Feedback Statement
S March 2015 FRS 104 Interim Financial Reporting
40 FRS 101 (Revised)
ED December 2014 FRED 57 Draft Amendments to FRS 101 Reduced Disclosure Framework
41 Implementation of EU Accounting Directive
CO February 2015 Consultation Overview: FREDs 58, 59 and 60. Implementation of the
EU Accounting Directive
DP February 2015 FRED 58 Draft FRS 105 The Financial Reporting Standard Applicable to
Micro-entities Regime; FRED 59 Draft Amendments to FRS 102; FRED
60 Draft Amendments to FRS 100
IA February 2015 Consultation Stage Impact Assessment
IA, FB July 2015 Impact Assessment and Feedback Statement relating to
FRED 50, 57, 58, 59, 60 and 61
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